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Johnson Space Center
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INTRODUCTION
The Priroda module is the last of six principal modules that will compose the Mir space station.
To be launched in April, 1996, it will be added to the Mir base block, Quant, Quant II, Kristall,
and Spektr, each launched between 1986 and 1995. Together with Soyuz and Progress
transport vehicles, the system has been in operation in orbit for more than ten years.
In 1990, the U.S. and Russia began a joint program of scientific and manned space flight
studies in response to agreements reached by the Bush Administration. Initial activities
included the conduct of medical experiments studying the effects of long-duration space flight
on board Mir. Provisions were made for the flight of a Russian cosmonaut on Space Shuttle,
and of an American astronaut on board Mir. After an initial period of activity of approximately
one year, the program was expanded through a contractual agreement to include the docking
of up to ten Space Shuttle missions to Mir, the addition of several American astronauts on Mir
and of Russian cosmonauts being brought to and from Mir on the Shuttle, and of the flight of
approximately 2000 kilograms of scientific hardware and support systems on board Mir.
Both the Spektr and Priroda modules were designed in the mid to late 1980s and the flight
systems constructed and assembled in 1989 to 1991. Priroda was to have been launched by
1992. As the U.S./Russian contract was put in place the modules were reconfigured and
retrofitted to house U.S. science hardware. This resulted in the elimination of some Russian
scientific systems, and in the addition of module secondary structure and other modifications.
In May, 1994, the Spektr module was launched to the Mir station. It carried approximately 700
kilograms of U.S. scientific payload, principally in the medical fields. The launch, docking, and
subsequent activation of Spektr occurred during the same period that the American astronaut,
Dr. Norman Thagard, was completing a four month endurance mission on Mir.
The U.S. Priroda effort, coming after a period of intense work to meet the Spektr integration
activity schedule, was structured and organized in an effort to establish long-term working
relationships and to develop an infrastructure for the integration and operation of future
spacecraft systems. In addition to the spacecraft systems and experiments integrated on
Priroda, several significant integration mechanisms were established. These included
prototypes for the definition of systems requirements, integration documentation, and
resources, including manifest, control documentation. Also, new concepts and hardware was
introduced for the housing of hardware on Shuttle and Mir, and to expedite hardware transfer
between the two vehicles.
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the NASA/Mir program has been the ability and
necessity of the Russian and American program’s engineering and management staffs to work
together, gaining mutual experience, trust and respect.
THE PRIRODA MODULE
Priroda, at the time of the signing of the U.S. /Russian contract, was due to be launched in
1991, though a more realistic launch date was probably in early 1992. As a result of additional
effort required to implement the NASA/Mir contract, delays in work on the Spektr and other
difficulties, including internal Russian funding, manpower, and contractual problems, the
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Priroda launch was repeatedly delayed, until at the time of this writing the launch is scheduled
for mid-April, 1995.
Priroda’s total mass is 19.5 metric tons, of which 3400 kg is scientific hardware, most of which
is Russian and Russian affiliated earth resources observation equipment. Of the total, the
U.S. is providing 850 kg of materials processing, life sciences, earth observation and support
systems at launch and will also bring considerable additional equipment for placement on
Priroda during the course of the NASP/Mir science program. The module is capable of
autonomous flight prior to its docking with Mir, and includes significant new service systems
which will enhance Mire’s earth observation and telemetry capabilities.
A representation of the major Priroda features is included as figure 1.
The Priroda module is approximately 2.9 m in diameter over most of its length, with five
bulkhead rings, a spherical base to which an unpressurized instrumentation structure is
mated, and a conical base (at launch) in which is placed the docking system and hatch for
crew intravehicular transfers.
The Priroda module includes a payload shroud, the instrument/payload compartment, and an
instrument module. The shroud is deployed during the launch sequence and protects the
module and external equipment from aerodynamic effects. The instrument compartment is the
main portion of the module and houses spacecraft systems, experiments, and the pressurized
area for crew operations. The instrument module is unpressurized sections housing spacecraft
systems.
The instrument / payload compartment is divided lengthwise into three sections. The first
compartment principally houses modules systems hardware while the later two house
primarily payload systems. All of the U.S. designed hardware is installed in the instrument/
payload compartment. The instrument / payload compartment is divided into an inner
habitation and work compartment and an outer instrumentation compartment. The two are
divided by aluminum-magnesium coated plastic panels. The panels provide a fire break and
form a significant portion of the modules environmental control system, allowing conditioned air
to flow through the crew compartment before returning through the instrumentation
compartment.
The instrument module, in part aft of the instrument/ payload compartment and in part
surrounding the compartment, carries propulsion system components, EVA restraints, and
scientific equipment.
In order to accommodate U.S. systems and scientific hardware the Russians modified the
Priroda module to include additional structural load bearing elements and the addition of
additional openings and internal compartments for containment of U.S. systems. Several
Russian experiment systems, some in the biotechnological area, had to be eliminated in favor
in order to meet contractual obligations with the U.S.
THE U.S. P RIRODA EFFO RT
Phase 1A of the program was in progress during a major period of development and
integration of medical science hardware in support of Spacelab missions. The effort was
placed under the auspices of the Johnson Space Center. Consequently, Spacelab
hardware, such as the Standard Interface Assembly (SIA) Rack and MIPS data management
system hardware were adopted for use in outfitting Mir. These resources were invaluable in
saving the development effort the resources of time and dollars, especially as the Phase 1A
started principally as a medical research effort using many of Spacelab’s existing experiment
systems.
In planning for Phase 1 B, efforts were being made to expand the Mir research program into
the areas of materials processing, biotechnology, and earth resources research. Many of the
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systems in use or in development in these areas had been developed for use in the Space
Shuttle middeck.
In the period from 1993 through early 1994, a significant effort was being directed by NASA
Headquarters to reduce the resource requirements associated with flying Shuttle missions.
Included in the cost reduction efforts would be an effort to reduce the costs associated with
payloads and science implementation. Spacehab, Incorporated had recently flown the first
successful Spacehab mission on STS-57, and put forward an unsolicited proposal to support
the Mir missions. Spacehab was built to support the NASA commercialization effort under the
Commercial Middeck Augmentation Module Project, specifically to expand the capability to fly
payloads developed for use in the Shuttle middeck.
By the late spring of 1994, it appeared likely that NASA would shift its Mir efforts away from
Spacelab and towards Spacehab. The availability of experiment systems developed for use
in the Shuttle middeck, combined with the potential for use of the Spacehab module for the Mir
missions, led to the adoption of middeck compatible resources on board Priroda. Although a
new design specifically for use in Priroda, single lockers were designed specifically for
commonality in dimensions and utility routing with similar systems on board the Shuttle
middeck and Spachab. In order to expedite the logistics of hardware transfers between
Space Shuttle and Mir, a family of soft stowage bags designed for fit into the lockers was
designed and developed. Payload utility panels adapted from the Middeck Utility Panel on
Shuttle, and designed specifically as an interface between the Priroda power system and
middeck-class experiments provided power resources. The centralized PUPS also limited the
number of interfaces directly between the U.S. experiments and the Mir power system,
thereby simplifying the developing of electrical interface drawings and affording some
protection to both Mir systems and U.S. payloads. In order to meet Russian schedules for a
launch by early summer of 1995, a crash development process was put in place by July,
1994, with a preliminary design review in August, 1994, a preliminary ICD issued
concurrently, and flight ready systems hardware was in hand beginning in September, 1994.
Fabrication of all mounting panels, adapter plates, and single and double lockers was
completed by December, 1994, and racks, and the U.S. power distribution system were
completed by February, 1995.
During the same time period, major experiment systems were being adopted for use in
Priroda. These included the Microgravity Glovebox, a system designed originally for use in
Spacelab, adopted for use in the middeck, and modified to meet Priroda requirements.
Accommodations for Shuttle Thermal Enclosure System (STES) units, which had been in
extensive use for a variety of commercial and scientific efforts such as the Protein Crystal
Growth series of missions, were included in the Priroda planning. The Bioreactor, a system
for the development of living cells and which had a near term requirement for long duration
missions, was adopted for use on Priroda in the form of the Biotechnology System. An
agreement between NASA an the Canadian Space Agency brought a third nation’s
experiment’s into the U.S. Priroda effort in the form of the Microgravity Isolation Mount (MIM)
and experiments designed for use with it. Other systems included the Enhanced Dynamic
Load Sensor (EDLS), for making anthropometric measurements, the Commercial Generic
Bioprocessing Apparatus, video and photographic equipment, and several experiments in
combustion, fluid dynamics, and biology, A data management system, the Mir Interface to
Payload Systems (MIPS), developed initially for use on Shuttle and adapted for use on
Spektr, was also included.
INTEGRATION PROCESS ES
With the beginning of Phase 1 B of the NASA/Mir program, a contract for the integration of U.S.
hardware was established between the Russian Space Agency and NASA. In response the
Russians began to centralize their integration organization.
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The Rocket and Space Company (RSC) Energia, as the prime contractor for defining
integration requirements and vehicle configuration for the Russian Space Agency, has been
responsible for the development of all of the Russian, and previously Soviet, manned space
vehicles. The company is organized into several major groups responsible for
• vehicle definition, development and integration,
• systems design and integration
• science and applications
• testing
An organization chart based upon the author’s observations is included as figure 2.
As the NASA/Mir program developed, responsibility for integration of U.S. hardware was
ldelegated to the science and app ications group. This group had been responsible for the
definition and development of technological, biotechnological, and medical experiment
systems for Energia. Though the group had been responsible for preparing integration
documentation for their own systems and also had a science program management and
integration department.
At the beginning of the U.S. effort to develop systems for use on Priroda, NASA already had
over a year and a half of experience with the Spektr activities. Though the Spektr effort was
largely successful, it was not without difficulty. Spektr comprised most of Phase 1A of the
program. The Phase 1A portion of the NASA/Mir program was done without the benefit of a
formal contract and therefore firm guidelines, processes, and programmatic or technical
requirements were not established and a formal, centralized configuration control system was
not in place.
Although a programmatic requirements document, the US/R-001, was initiated by the Russian
side’s medical research/integration group, the document was never completed and never
formally signed. Consequently no schedules, programmatic requirements, or documentation
requirements were ever firmly established.
Integration documentation, in the form of ’100 Series’ documents, equivalent to the Space
Shuttle program’s Payload Integration Plan, Annexes, and ICDs, were not consistently
required or applied. Individual Russian engineers from the science and applications group
were responsible for guiding the development of the integration documents, but content of the
documents was largely the up to each individual engineer's personal definitions. Similarly,
hardware testing requirements were not uniformly applied. In some cases, the Energia
integration group was bypassed by NASA investigators working directly with other Russian
science organizations such as the Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP).
Similarly, though a systems and environmental requirements document was developed and
signed during Phase 1A, it was incomplete and inadequate, and without a defined
configuration control mechanism, new requirements were being established continuously. By
mid-1994, no fewer than six, sometimes conflicting, versions of the US/R-002 Systems
Requirements document were in use.
The process for integrating hardware and preparing documentation was largely ad hoc, with
the integration groups, hardware test engineers, principal investigators and experiment
engineers, and hardware coming together for meetings at which the U.S. side presented the
experiment hardware and set about preparing and reviewing integration documentation.
Frequently hardware had been tested and certified prior to the test and certification
requirements having been defined.
Early in the Priroda effort, meetings were held between the principal NASA and contractor
engineers and their Russian counterparts in Russia. A plan was developed for the definition
of design and test requirements and for the development of draft integration documentation.
This would occur in two phases; the initial would occur in Russia approximately six months
prior to hardware turnover. A second review of documentation in the U.S. would occur two
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months prior to hardware certification testing. Although the design of many of the support and
experiment systems was already well along by the time either of the reviews would occur,
the reviews would allow the definition of an acceptable hardware testing program far enough
in advance to permit the program to be planned and scheduled accordingly.
Initially, requirement reviews and documentation reviews were scheduled according to
hardware development plans. This proved to be unworkable as there were frequently
overlapping activities occurring in both the U.S. and Russia. Therefore a phased approach
was introduced in which reviews would be planned so that the center of activity would shift
approximately every one to two months. The schedule of meetings carried out was:
1994  August
November
1995 February-March
May-June
July
August
November
-December
1996  February
Moscow
Houston
Moscow
Houston
/Huntsville
Moscow
Houston
Moscow
Baikonur
Requirements definition for support systems
Final documentation preparation and test
activities for support systems
Requirements definition for experiment
systems and support system hardware
turnover
Final documentation preparation and test
activities for experiment systems
Requirements definition for experiment
systems and experiment system hardware
turnover
Final documentation preparation for stowed
hardware and test activities for experiment
systems
Integrated testing of active hardware in
the Priroda module and turnover of stowed
hardware
Integration of experiment systems and
stowed hardware for flight-March
Periodically, the schedule became compressed and U.S. and Russian engineers would find
themselves flying back and forth between the U.S. and Russia, together, as the center of
activity shifted. But generally the approach always permitted the full understanding of
hardware test requirements early enough that changes could be introduced, sometimes to the
hardware design, and frequently to the hardware test program. The approach permitted time
for developing document translations and also permitted hardware developers to plan for a
second opportunity for hardware acceptance testing in the case that the first opportunity had
to be aborted for technical problems.
Typically, an overview of the hardware, its operational procedures, and the test plans and
requirements were defined first (100, 101, 102, 105 and 108 documents). Test results and
safety documentation (106, 107) were submitted approximately at the time of hardware
testing. Russian engineers responsible for hardware integration frequently had the
opportunity to participate in and observe the hardware testing, and they concentrated their
documentation reviews on all but crew training and safety documentation.
After the initial phase of documentation generation for support systems was completed
(August, 1994), both sides agreed that it would be of mutual benefit to develop a set of
guidelines or ‘blank books’ for experiment developers to use in preparing their integration
documentation. The documentation being developed until this time was frequently inconsistent
owing to different Russian engineer’s opinions on the appropriate document contents. It was
also anticipated that standardizing the content and structure would simplify the job of
translation, also reducing the cost for this considerable effort. The U.S. side lead this effort,
reorganizing some of the document outlines so that redundancies could be eliminated. Blank
books were formally approved by both sides in March, 1995. Unfortunately the late
distribution did not permit their full use by the major experiment developers as their
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documentation was already well along in development. Stowed systems and later Space
Shuttle launched payloads going to Mir would find the documents of value, however.
Also during this period a new 001 document was prepared, identifying major milestones to be
met by experiment developers; the 002 document was expanded and the multiple versions
consolidated into a single set of requirements; and the format and contents of an 004 document
were defined in order to maintain a manifest of all systems, interfaces, and resource
requirements. A schedule of activities covering all documentation and hardware testing was
published approximately every six weeks, and when managers and engineers were not
attending meetings or reviews in one another’s country, telecons were being held frequently.
Communications, either through telecons or faxes had to be maintained, as did the schedule of
activities.
PROBLEM AREAS
Difficulties arose most frequently when organizations external to those responsible for U.S.
experiment integration or for science were required to support activities. These incidents were
most notable in the areas of training, operations and safety.
Training is conducted not by the Energia organization but by the Russian military at Star City.
Energia science ‘curators’ are responsible, however, for on-orbit experiment operations.
Although Star City trainers came to the U.S. to support some documentation and hardware
reviews, training documents (108) were almost never reviewed or ultimately used. Energia
curators almost never attended training sessions in the U.S. or in Russia. And other Energia
operations personnel from the TSUP control center appeared totally unaware of U.S.
experiment systems, their operations or requirements, until after the systems arrive in orbit.
Safety reviews of experiment or other systems have not been regularly conducted by the
Russian safety organization. Safety approvals have been a major difficulty. The most
emphasis is given in the materials area, though even here the organization and individuals
responsible for the review, and who do not represent the safety organization, do not appear
to go through a rigorous review process. Few detailed safety requirements have been defined
and no ‘standard practices” guidelines, such as are available for the U.S. Shuttle program,
have been provided. Russian materials engineers failed to attend many hardware reviews
and test sessions and safety engineers were never in attendance.
Frequently inconsistencies arose in the handling of potential issues between different
experiments, or even on the same system or experiment, from one review to another. One of
the best examples occurred in the area of stowage provisions. After encountering serious
materials concerns and issues with stowage foam provided by the U.S. for Spetr, the use of
new acceptable materials was given a high priority early in the Priroda activity. Materials,
processes and requirements were defined early with the full support of the Russian materials
organization. But after hardware had been completed and submitted for final review prior to
flight, new requirements were imposed, ultimately resulting in a total rebuilding of the stowage
system.
Although safety associated documentation was required to be provided early, the information
was not reviewed as it was being provided. Feedback on the results of the Russian reviews
was so late that little remedial action could be taken-hardware had already been delivered and
installed for flight.
The Russian organizational structure has been a hindrance in efficiently carrying out the
overall Priroda effort. For instance, considerable flight-like training hardware was provided for
outfitting a trainer at the Star City training facility. But since the trainers come under the
responsibility of the military rather than the Energia hardware integration group, much of the
U.S. training hardware has never been used.
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Maintaining the schedule was a principal difficulty in the integration effort. Part of this problem
was a result of inaccurate schedules provided by the Russians early in the program. For
instance, the design, development, production, and testing of the U.S. support systems was
expedited at some expense in man-hours and dollars, in order to meet the initial spacecraft
integration schedule requirements. Hardware such as the lockers and electrical system was
ready for the initial Russian review in late September of 1994, but the Russian’s first trip to
the U.S. to review the Priroda hardware was delayed until November as a result of
bureaucratic problems. Hardware which the U.S. was required to deliver in early 1995 was
never used until late in the year.
Early in the program, delays to the Russian’s travel in turn delayed several of the hardware
test activities until complete joint approval was gained and until Russians were physically
present to observe some testing. The decision was reached, mutually, at the time of this
November meeting, that in the future test activities would be conducted according to the
schedule jointly agreed to at the previous meeting, regardless of whether all appropriate
engineers would be in place by the required time. Such agreements, including schedule
details, were included in joint meeting ‘protocols’.
Another schedule challenge faced in late 1994 and early 1995, was shipping and customs.
Lockers, some four dozen of which completed testing activities by early December, 1994,
were shipped immediately from the U.S. Shipping delays initially occurred as a result of
common carrier problems. Then, when the hardware reached Russia, it was immediately taken
into Russian Customs storage facilities. There it stayed through late February, 1995. After a
thorough series of investigations, including researching the shipping policies for overseas
airlines and several visits to the Russian Customs house, it was determined that delays
resulted from two principal difficulties. The first was related to the size of the hardware
shipping container. The larger the container, the more likely hardware would miss overseas
flights. The second problem was due principally to delays by the Energia organization. These
investigations led to discussions with the NASA shipping organization on how to package
items in the future, with U.S. customs and the NASA Headquarters international office on
required shipping documentation and external markings, and ultimately to the decision to
attempt to hand-carry most hardware with engineers attending reviews in Russia. The
concerted effort resulted in the reduction of typical transportation time to two days for hand-
carried items and to approximately two weeks for typical shipped items.
The lack of a single authority to control all components of a space mission to the same degree
that NASA does for the U.S. frequently creates inefficiencies and confusion’s that thwarts the
best efforts of the individuals and individual organizations. Separate entities are responsible
for integration and integration requirements (Energia), physical development and integration
(Krunechev), training and training facilities (military-), and for launch processing (military Space
Command). Within Energia, different organizations appear responsible for pre-flight integration
and for in-flight operations.
HARDWARE INTEGRATION
After several delays to the Priroda module schedule, the module was ready for the integration
of U.S. hardware in December, 1995. Testing at the KIS test facility in Kaliningrad proceeded
according to plan with a single serious technical problem, fully the responsibility of the U.S.
side. The problem points out the significance of standardizing engineering practices and
maintaining communications.
A data cable connecting the MIPS data system to the MIM experiment, was miswired, causing
a blown fuse in the MIM. The failure resulted form a combination of problems. The MIPS
system utilized non mil spec connector which had not been wired in accordance with mil spec
requirements. The data cable was improperly designed, and miscommunication, first
between the MIPS, MIM, and Star City training group resulted in no test having been
conducted between training hardware units, even though it was believed that a successful
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test had been performed. Next, Russian engineers failed to follow jointly approved test
requirements for an interface and functional test external to the Priroda module, prior to
integration.
In January, 1996, a new MIM unit, already in preparation, was shipped to Moscow and then
to Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. It was the last major piece of U.S. hardware
accepted for integration.
U.S. engineers worked together with their Russian counterparts to integrate and test U.S.
hardware at Baikonur. This activity occurred over a week long period without significant
difficulties. Those which did arise came about mainly because the physical integration of
hardware it the responsibility of the Krunechev Manufacturing company, rather than the
Energia company which had responsibility for defining systems and integration requirements.
SUMMARY
Priroda provided an excellent challenge and an opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate that it
still has the capacity to develop space hardware for flight according to compressed
schedules-something we have not had to do routinely in recent years.
Perhaps more significantly, Priroda permitted Russian and U.S. personnel to gain insight into
the mechanisms and operations, frequently very different, in use by one another in order to
prepare and fly their spacecraft, and perhaps most importantly, it created new friendships and
developed confidence in one another’s technical abilities. Both could have great importance for
future cooperative efforts in space.
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FIGURE 1A: MAJOR EXTERNAL FEATUReS OF PRIRODA
FIGURE IB: U.S. SYSTEMS INTERNAL TO PRIRODA
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